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Abstract 
In  the  conventional  QALY  model,  people’s  preferences  are  assumed  to  satisfy  utility 
independence.  When health varies over time, utility independence implies that the value 
attached to a health state is independent of the health state that arise before or after it.  In this 
paper we set out to test the extent to which utility independence is undermined by sequence 
and  duration  effects.  Two  separate  studies  were  conducted  involving  a  total  of  155 
respondents.  In study one, we conducted 5 tests of utility independence using a standard 
gamble question.  Three of the tests of utility independence were repeated in study two after 
randomisation was introduced in order to take account of possible ordering effects.  Utility 
independence  holds  in  the  majority  of  cases  examined  here  and  so  our  work  generally 
supports the use of utility independence to derive more tractable models.  
KEY WORDS: utility independence, QALY. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
Governments  are  increasingly  drawing  upon  survey  techniques  to  incorporate  people’s 
opinions  into  policy,  the  interpretation  of  which  often  involves  a  set  of  simplifying 
assumptions drawn from economic theory. We investigate the application of Keeney and 
Raiffa’s (1976) utility independence assumption to interpret people’s preferences towards 
risky treatments when health varies over time (Drummond et al, 1997).  The descriptive 
validity of utility independence has been questioned by psychologists who argue that people 
may have preferences over the sequencing and duration of health states (Loewenstein and 
Prelec,  1993).    Such  doubts  have  led  to  the  use  of  alternative  means  of  incorporating 
preferences  that  relax  somewhat  the  assumption  of  utility  independence  (Guerrero  and 
Herrero ,2005).  
 
In this paper we set out to test utility independence when health states vary over time, which, 
as  far  as  we  are  aware,  has  not  been  previously  tested.  The  Background  reviews  other 
authors’ tests of independence for both chronic health states and when health varies over time 
and provides the motivation for the current study.  In the Method and Results, we outline the 
design and main findings.  These findings are further reviewed in the Discussion and we 




Quality  adjusted  life  years  (QALYs)  are  used  by  health  economists  to  quantify  people's 
preferences towards treatments that differ in terms of quality of life and life expectancy. 
When health states vary over time the QALY approach assumes that it is valid to estimate the 
utility  of  the  health  states  independently  of  one  another  and  simply  adds  these  utilities (appropriately weighted by a measure of a respondent’s preferences for time).  For example, 
suppose a person experiences health state X in period 1, Y in period 2 and Z in period 3, and 
we represent this by the health profile XYZ.  The QALY approach then estimates the utility 
of the profile XYZ using equation (1). 
  U(XYZ) = w1  U1(X) + w2   U2(Y) + w3 U3(Z)           (1) 
where wi is the time discount factor and Ui(.) is the utility function at time i, for i=1,2,3.  
 
When health states vary over time, Bleichrodt (1995) and Bleichrodt & Quiggin (1997) show 
that  for  QALYs  to  be  a  valid  measure  under  Expected  Utility  Theory  it  is  necessary  to 
assume additive independence over disjoint time periods. Additive independence holds if the 
preferences between risky treatments depend only upon the marginal rather than the joint 
probability distributions of the health states (Bleichrodt & Quiggin, 1997, p.154; Keeney & 
Raiffa, 1976, p.230 and p.263, Fishburn 1965). Under additive independence a respondent 
should be indifferent between a risky treatment with a 0.5 chance of profile XXX and 0.5 
chance of YYY and a risky treatment with a 0.5 chance of YXX and 0.5 chance of XYY, In 
this  example,  we  have  underlined  the  states  that  are  varied  in  the  test.  There  is  limited 
evidence on additive independence, but Spencer (2003) observed some violations of additive 
independence. 
 
Additive independence is strong assumption and may not always hold.  But this does not 
imply  an  end  to  the  QALY  approach,  because  if  the  weaker  assumption  of  utility 
independence still holds then this can be used as the basis to derive models that are more 
tractable.   If so, these model may not be as simple as the conventional QALY model and 
may require the estimatation of weights for different phases of a person’s life cycle (see page 
33 Bleichrodt, 1995).  There are two lines of investigation of utility independence: one for chronic health states the other for health states that vary over time.  Research suggests that 
utility independence holds for chronic health states, although the tests of utility independence 
for chronic states are rather different to those for the when health states vary over time.  
Miyamoto  and  Eraker  (1988)  found  that  a  respondent’s  risk  attitude  towards  different 
survival durations was unaffected by health quality and concluded that survival duration is 
utility independent of health quality for chronic health states.  Bleichrodt and Johannesson 
(1997) found that utility scores are unaffected by duration after allowing for the imprecision 
of preferences and concluded that quality was utility independence of survival duration for 
chronic  states.  Doctor  et  al. (2004)  also  found support  for  the  QALY  model  for  chronic 
states,  and  by  implication  utility  independence for  chronic  states.  Finally,  Bleichrodt  and 
Pinto (2005), also found support for utility independence for chronic states in a model that 
took account of violations of Expected Utility. 
 
Much less is known about the situation where health states vary over time. When health 
states vary over time utility independence holds if preferences between risky treatments, that 
contain the same health state in period i do not depend upon the severity of the health state 
in period i  (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976, p.226).  However, this utility independence assumption 
does not appear to have been tested which we consider to be an important omission from the 
literature and we aim to address in our paper. Treadwell (1998) tested a special case of utility 
independence,  where  all  alternatives  are  certain,  termed  preferential  independence. 
Preferential independence was satisfied in the majority of cases (36 out of the 42 tests) even 
though his tests were designed to be sensitive to violations of preferential independence, 
Further,  preferential  independence  held  regardless  of  the  discount  rate  used.    However, 
preferential independence is not sufficient to imply useful models when alternatives are risky. 
 There is reason to doubt that utility independence will hold when health varies over time. 
Psychologists  have  argued  that  respondents  may  have  preferences  over  the  ordering  of 
events,  known  also  as  sequencing  effects  (Gafni,  1995;  Ross  &  Simonson,  1991).  A 
respondent may experience ‘dread’ and desire to overcome ill-health in the short term or 
prefer to ‘savour’ the prospect of good health in the long term (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993). 
A respondent may also pay more attention to the final health state in a profile (Kahneman, at 
al 1993; Varey & Kahneman 1992) and under-weight earlier states.  They may also adapt to 
health in a positive or negative manner over time (Ross & Simonson, 1991).  
 
Guerrero  and  Herrero  (2005)  recently  relaxed  utility  independence  in  a  semi-separable 
QALY approach that allows for some sequence effects (see also Meyer Chapter 9 in Keeney 
and Raiffa, 1976).  In so doing, they distinguish between ‘initial independence’ and ‘final 
independence’.  In the former, the conditional preferences for lotteries over the final health 
states are independent of the initial health states.  In the latter, preferences for lotteries over 
the initial health states are independent of the final health states. The semi-separable QALY 
approach  requires  only  that  ‘initial  independence’  applies.    The  approach  can,  therefore, 
incorporate  respondents’  preferences  for  increasing  or  decreasing  profiles  over  time.  In 
addition, the model can allow for duration effects, whereby prolonged exposure to severe 
states lead to a decrease in utility.  However, no information exists on the descriptive force of 
their conditions which is something we aim to do also in this paper. 
 
Thus, we set out to design a study that tested utility independence and the extent to which 
initial and final independence holds. The aims and objectives of the study are: 
To carry out a test of utility independence in risky choices for mild and severe health states.   
To test the impact of changing health at the beginning or end of a health profile.  
3. Methods 
 
Four states were used in these profiles and were colour-coded such that normal health (N) 
was represented by pink, mild disability (Y) by yellow, severe disability (B) by blue, and 
death  (D)  by  black.   The  health  state  descriptions  were  taken  from  a  Health  and  Safety 
financed project which investigated the impact of health states in the long term and are given 
in figure 1.   
 
A set of ‘life profiles’ were developed each covering a 25 years period, made up of 5 periods 
of 5 years. In the notation that we use NNNBB denotes 15 years in normal (N), followed by 
10 in the severe disability (B), whereas YNNNN denotes 5 years in the mild disability (Y) 
followed by 20 years in normal health.  
 
The test of utility independence was based on a SG question that it is commonly used in 
health economics to elicit utilities of health states
1. Respondents were first asked a ‘practice’ 
SG question in order to familiarise them with the response format.  This question asked them 
                                                 
 
1 Keeney and Raiffa’s test of utility independence in the QALY model would involve setting the probability of 
the risky treatment at 0.5, and asking respondents to vary outcomes in the certain treatment to compensate for 
variations in the severity of health in period i .  We considered that it would be difficult to ask respondents to 
vary the severity of health in this manner.  In contrast, we set the outcomes and asked respondents to vary the 
probability of the risky treatment to compensate for variations in the severity of health in period i .  Adapting 
the question in  this way allowed us  to base  the  test on  a SG question  that  it is commonly used in health 
economics to elicit utilities of health states. to compare a risky treatment with NNNNN (25 years in normal health) as the best outcome 
and DDDDD (death 25 years early) as the worst outcome, to the certainty of NNDDD (10 
years in normal health followed by death).  Respondents were then presented with a table that 
showed the chances of success and failure associated with the risky treatment.  For each 
chance  of  success  and  failure  they  were  asked  to  consider  whether  they  preferred  the 
certainty, preferred the risky treatment, or found it too hard to choose between those two 
options and the mid-point value was taken between the choices they found hard to choose). 
Respondents were encouraged to consider the top and bottom of the table first and state their 
preference and to then work through the rest of the rows at their own speed.     
 
After completing the practice question, respondents were presented with five tests of utility 
independence, each test comprising of two SG questions, A and B, making ten SG questions 
in all. Table 1 details the five tests of utility independence. In this table we underline the 
states that are varied between the two ‘halves’ of each test.  For example, in question 5A 
respondents  were  offered  the  certainty  of  profile  NNNBN  and  a  pA  chance  of  profile 
NNNNN  and  1-pA  chance  of  BBBBN.    Whereas  in  question  5B  they  were  offered  the 
certainty of profile NNNBB and a pB chance of profile NNNNB and 1-pB chance of BBBBB.  
For each question the chances of success and failure were given in a table in a SG booklet. 
The null hypothesis is that utility independence holds and pA =  pB.  In each case, the two 
‘halves’ of the independence test were answered consecutively.  This was done in order to 
minimise the possibility that any differences detected between the two treatments were due to 
‘random noise’ by encouraging respondents to compare parts A and B directly.  
 
 Tests 1 and 5 explore the impact of changing the health state in the last period from normal 
health to the severe disability. Evidence that preferences are affected by the final health states 
in these tests would be consistent with the semi-separate QALY approach of Guerrero and 
Herrero  (2005)  but  not  the  conventional  QALY  model.  Tests  1  and  5  also  allows  an 
examination of the extent to which responses are consistent between questions since the best 
and worst outcomes associated with these risky treatments are identical.  For consistency we 
would expect the chance at which a respondent is indifferent in 1A to be lower than in 5A, 
and that in 1B to be lower than in 5B, since the certain outcome is worse in 1A compared to 
5A, and worse in 1B compared to 5B.  Tests 2 and 3 explore the impact of changing the 
health state in the first period from normal health to severe disability (test 2) or to mild 
disability  (test  3).  It  is  important  to  note  that  both  Guerrero  and  Herrero's  (2005)  semi-
separable QALY approach and the conventional QALY are undermined if changes in the 
initial health states affect the preferences for the final health states
2.   
 
Test 4 examines the impact of changing the health state in the first and second period from 
normal health to severe disability. Test 4 differs from all the other tests in two main ways:  a) 
health changes for 10 years across the two ‘halves’ of the test and b) there is a prospect of 
premature death in the worst outcome.  It seems plausible that both serve to increase the 
salience of the severity of the disability, making violations of independence more likely.  
 
We first carried out a series of paired sample t-tests, in each case comparing responses to part 
A and part B, using a significance level of 5%.  We corrected for repeated testing by reducing 
                                                 
 
2 Guerrero  and  Herrero`s  model  is  a  dynamic  decision  model  where  preferences  are  independent  of  what 
happened  in  the past.    To  test initial independence fully  in  their  model would require asking questions  at 
different points in time. the significance level of each test following the procedure suggested by Bonferroni (Maxwell 
and  Delaney,  1990).    The  significance  level  was  reduced  to  0.01  in  study  one  (i.e. 
0.05/5=0.01,  where  there  were  five  comparisons)    and  to  0.0167  in  study  2  (i.e. 
0.05/3=0.0167, where there were three comparisons).   
  
A convenience sample of students registered at the Economics Department at Queen Mary 
University of London was used.  Students who took part in the study were naive to the 
hypothesis being tested and to methods used to measure health state utility.  Between 10 and 
20 students took part in each session.  The researcher illustrated the SG questions using 
overhead slides and checked that respondents understood the practice question.  The students 
were then asked to progress through the SG booklet at their own speed.   
 
4. Results of study one 
 
The sample comprised of 64 respondents, 37 males, 27 females with a mean age of 21. 
Table 2a shows the mean, median and standard deviations of the responses, given in terms of 
the chance of success where respondents were indifferent between the two treatments. For 
consistency we would expect that the chance at which a respondent is indifferent in 1A to be 
lower than in 5A, and that in 1B to be lower than in 5B.  Of the 64 respondents, 42 were 
strictly consistent in both tests (i.e. p1A< p5A and p1B < p5B , where  the subscripts denote both 
the question and part), 2 were strictly consistent in one test and weakly consistent in the other 
(i.e. p1A> p5A and p1B = p5B or vice versa), 14 respondents were strictly inconsistent in at least 
one test (i.e. p1A > p5A and/or  p1B > p5B ), whilst the pattern was indeterminate for the 
remaining 6 respondents due to missing data.  
 The results of paired t tests comparing the two ‘halves’ A and B of each test are given in table 
2b.  Clearly, there is no significant difference at the 5% level between responses to parts A 
and B in the case of four of the five independence tests carried out.  The data were also re-
examined after the 14 respondents giving at least one strictly inconsistent response had been 
removed with no change in the results. For each of the 5 tests in turn, the p values without 
(with) ‘inconsistent’ respondents were as follows: 1 (0.494) for test 1, 0.493 (0.479) for test 
2, 0.311 (0.155) for test 3, 0.285 (0.864) for test 4 and 0.000 (0.001) for test 5. Hence, we 
have to conclude that utility independence generally holds in the way we set out to examine it 
here.   
 
It is only in test 5 that we do find a significant difference, in particular, a significantly greater 
number of respondents set the indifference value of p higher in question 5A than in 5B (pA >  
pB).    Further,  the  null  hypothesis  of  independence  for  test  5  is  still  rejected  after  the 
significance level is adjusted in order to allow for repeated tests (in this case, to p=0.01).  
This finding is slightly puzzling as test 5 was identical to test 1 other than the duration of 
severe health under the certain outcome.    
 
5. Caveats to study one 
 
In  study  one,  utility  independence  was  found  to  hold  in  general  although  we  did find  a 
significant difference in the case of one of the tests - namely test 5 - whereby respondents 
were significantly more likely to set p higher in part A than part B.   We identified a number 
of caveats to the tests carried out in study one.  First, it seemed plausible that a sample of 
economic students, even with no specific knowledge of the QALY model and naïve to the 
hypothesis  under  examination,  may  have  a  desire  to  give  responses  that  are  apparently ‘consistent’ or ‘rational’.  By presenting the two halves of the test consecutively in each case 
may have made it more likely that they identified what the ‘rational’ response was in each 
case.  Further, we did not randomise the order of the parts to each test, with part A – the 
‘better’ half of the test – always preceding part B.  This may have made the data susceptible 
to  anchoring  and  adjustment  effects,  the  impact  of  which  being  hard  to  predict.    More 
importantly perhaps, we failed to randomise the order of the tests themselves, with test 5 
always appearing last in the response booklet.  It is impossible, therefore, to say whether the 
pattern uncovered between tests 1 and 5 (which were identical except for period of severe 
health in the certain outcome) was some sort of ordering effect.   
 
6. Study two 
 
A second study was conducted using the same sampling procedures as before, and drawing 
respondents from a convenience sample of students registered at the Economics Department 
at Queen Mary University of London.  As far as possible the procedures were identical to 
those described in study one, again with groups of between 10-20 respondents taking part in 
the study.  The crucial difference between the two studies being that, in study two, the tests 
(and  ‘halves’  of  the  tests)  were  presented  to  respondents  in  random  order  and  so  each 
respondent  received  a  booklet  containing  a  different  ordering  of  questions.  Due  to  time 
constraints, we elected to repeat only three of the five tests carried out previously.  These are 
shown in Table 1 as tests 1, 4 & 5.  Thus, in study two respondents were presented with a 
series of six SG questions in a random order (i.e. parts A and B of tests 1, 4 & 5 respectively)
 3. The health state descriptors, visual stimuli, response sheets and verbal instructions were 
identical to those used in study one.  
 
7. Results of study two 
 
The sample for study two comprised of 92 respondents, 48 males, 44 females with a mean 
age of 20.  Table 3a shows the mean, median and standard deviations of the responses, again 
given in terms of the chance of success where respondents were indifferent between the two 
treatments.  Again, we would expect that the chance at which a respondent is indifferent in 
1A to be lower than in 5A, and that in 1B to be lower than in 5B.  Of the 92 respondents, 51 
were strictly consistent in both tests (i.e. p1A< p5A and p1B < p5B , where the subscripts denote 
both the question and part), 15 were strictly consistent in one test and weakly consistent in 
the other (i.e. p1A < p5A and p1B = p5B or vice versa) 2 were weakly consistent in both tests 
(i.e. p1A= p5A and p1B =  p5B ), 20 respondents were strictly inconsistent in at least one test 
(i.e. p1A> p5A and/or  p1B > p5B), whilst the pattern was indeterminate for the remaining 4 
respondents due to missing data.   
 
The results of paired t tests comparing the two ‘halves’ A and B of each test are given in table 
3b.  There is no significant difference at the 5% level between responses to parts A and B in 
the  case  of  tests  4  and  5.  Again,  the  data  were  re-examined  after  the  20  ‘inconsistent’ 
respondents had been removed (those respondents who set the indifference value of p to be 
higher in test 1A than 5A and/or higher in 1B than 5B) with no significant change in results. 
                                                 
 
3 A random numbers generator was used to generate a random ordering of the 6 questions faced by respondents 
in study two.  For each of the three tests in turn, the p values without (with) ‘inconsistent’ respondents were 
as follows; 0.016 (0.008) for test one, 0.690 (0.973) for test four and 0.117 (0.417) for test 
five.  
 
Contrary  to  the  results  in  study  one,  it  is  only  in  test  1  that  we  now  find  a  significant 
difference, in particular, a significantly greater number of respondents set the indifference 
value of p higher in question 1A than in 1B (pA >  pB).  Further, the null hypothesis of 
independence for test 1 is still rejected after the significance level is adjusted in order to 
allow for repeated tests (in this case, to p=0.0167 as 3 comparisons were made).  This finding 
was unexpected and is the opposite effect to which we found in the first study (recall that in 




Treadwell  (1998)  tests  preferential  independence  when  health  varies  over  time  under 
conditions of certainty. We set out to see whether independence holds under conditions of 
uncertainty,  termed  ‘utility  independence’,  and  our  tests  are  a  valid  test  of  utility 
independence under both Expected Utility and Non-Expected Utility models (Miyamoto & 
and Wakker, 1996). Whilst our results were somewhat mixed, we find that independence 
generally holds in the way that we set out to examine it here.  It has been shown elsewhere 
that, if utility independence holds then it is still possible to derive models that are tractable, 
even if the stronger assumption of additive independence fails (Bleichrodt, 1995). On the face 
of it then, our findings are generally supportive of the use of QALYs in health care decision 
making, providing that an appropriate specification of the model is used (see Bleichrodt, 
1995 for details).  This finding, however, runs contrary to the evidence cited that sequence and duration effects 
do matter to people (Ross & Simonson, 1991;Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993; Kahneman, at al 
1993;  Varey  &  Kahneman  1992)  and  we  consider  below  the  possible  reasons  for  this 
discrepancy .  First, the task respondents undertook is fairly complex and they may have 
adopted ‘simplifying strategies’ in order to get through it. For example, respondents may 
have ‘edited out’ information that was obviously common across choices in order to simplify 
the  task,  making  violations  of  independence  less  likely.    Thus,  if  it  was  obvious  to 
respondents that one period of the profile was common across the risky and certain outcomes, 
the severity of this common period may have been ignored altogether- guaranteeing utility 
independence as assessed here.  
 
Second, the task presented to the respondents was highly abstract and it is possible that the 
stimulus failed to adequately emphasize the changing patterns of health status over time. It is 
possible that using stimuli that are more dynamic in nature, may better represent changes in 
health over time than the ‘static’ representations used here.  For example, Chapman (2000) 
used graphs to depict changes in the quality of health over time, which are arguably more 
appropriate stimuli to test for sequencing and duration effects than those used here. This is an 
issue that may be addressed in further studies.  
 
Certain of our findings, however, are more difficult to explain.  Whilst it seemed plausible 
that independence would be less likely to hold when the tests were presented in random order 
there is no obvious reason why test 1 should be significant in study two whilst test 5 is not 
(reversing the previous finding).  We believe that more weight ought to be placed on the 
findings of the second of the two studies that controlled for ordering effects, but this remains 
a finding to be investigated further.   One way forward for future research would be to conduct a qualitative study alongside the 
quantitative tests to reveal those factors that were considered by respondents in formulating 
their responses.  Such data may help determine whether there is a psychological explanation 
for  those  violations  of  independence  that  were  uncovered  here  or  whether  they  were  an 
artefact of the study design.   
 
More generally, it may be argued that asking respondents to consider the type of stylised, 
hypothetical  scenarios  used  here,  will  necessarily  fail  to  capture  feelings  of  adaptation, 
savouring and dread that may matter to people in real life.  Kahneman and Sugden (2005) 
distinguish between experienced utility (utility as hedonic experience) and decision utility 
(utility as a representation of preference) and argue that the latter will underestimate feelings 
of adaptation etc.  Others may argue that if decision utility corresponds more closely to what 
people think should influence their choices and is more normative in nature, then decision 
utility is more relevant for economic evaluations that are principally normative in character.  
Whilst it is not clear to us that we could (or even should
4) abandon the practice of eliciting 
values over hypothetical health states in utility assessment exercises, there may be particular 




We set out to see whether independence holds under conditions of uncertainty termed ‘utility 
independence’.   We find that utility independence holds in the majority of cases examined 
                                                 
 
4 As this would necessarily rule out the use of general population values for health states in favour of those of 
disparate groups of patients, making comparability and aggregation problematic. here.  In particular, changing the health state at either the beginning or the end of a profile did 
not have a significant impact on preferences over the remainder of that profile.  
 
Even if further research supports the currently limited evidence that additive independence 
fails (Spencer, 2003), then utility independence can be used as the basis to derive models that 
are tractable and can be applied to practical research.  Whilst these models are unlikely to be 
as simple at the conventional QALY model, it does not sound the death knell for the use of 
QALYs in economic evaluation.  References 
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 Table 1: The five tests of utility independence 
    Better outcome, p  Worse outcome,(1-p)  Certainty of: 
1A  NNNNN  BBBBN  NNBBN  Test one 
1B  NNNNB  BBBBB  NNBBB 
         
2A  NNNNN  NBBBB  NNNBB  Test two 
2B  BNNNN  BBBBB  BNNBB 
         
Test three  3A  NNNNN  NYYYY  NNNYY 
  3B  YNNNN  YYYYY  YNNYY 
         
Test four  4A  NNNNN  NNDDD  NNYYY 
  4B  BBNNN  BBDDD  BBYYY 
         
Test five  5A  NNNNN  BBBBN  NNNBN 











 Table 2a: Responses to the five tests of independence in Study One 
  Part   N  Mean  (Std)  Median 
A  62  0.601  (.165)  0.575  Test 1 
B  62  0.619  (.190)  0.600 
A  63  0.622  (.165)  0.625  Test 2 
B  63  0.606  (.197)  0.625 
A  63  0.555  (.185)  0.550  Test 3 
B  63  0.596  (.169  0.575 
A  63  0.715 (.191)  0.725  Test 4 
B  62  0.716 (.189)  0.750 
A  62  0.774  (.186)  0.800  Test 5 
B  61  0.731 (.172)  0.725 
 
  








1A – 1B  -0.0216  0.016  0.494 
2A – 2B  +0.0018  0.020  0.479 
3A – 3B  -0.0348  0.025  0.155 
4A – 4B  +0.0027  0.017  0.864 
5A – 5B  +0.0497*  0.014  0.001 
*the mean difference is significant at 0.05 level  
Table 3a: Responses to the three tests of independence in Study Two 
  Part   N  Mean  (Std)  Median 
A  87  0.603 (.189)  0.575  Test 1 
B  87  0.553 (.194)  0.525 
A  86  0.674 (.205)  0.700  Test 4 
B  86  0.675 (.218)  0.675 
A  90  0.706 (.189)  0.725  Test 5 
















1A – 1B  +0.0505*  0.019  0.008 
4A – 4B  -0.0067  0.019  0.973 
5A – 5B  +0.0137  0.017  0.417 









Figure 1. The health states     
Pink health state 
 
Yellow health state  Blue health state 
 
Compared  to  the  average 
person that age; 
 
•  Your indoor activities are 
not limited. 
 
•  Your outdoor activities 
are not  limited. 
 
•  You are full of energy.    
 
 
•  You are not in pain. 
 
 
Compared  to  the  average 
person that age; 
 
•  Your indoor activities are a 
bit more limited. 
  
•  Your outdoor activities are a 
bit more limited. 
 
•  You have a bit less energy. 
 
  
•  You are in a bit more pain.   
 
 
Compared  to  the  average 
person that age; 
 
•  Your indoor activities are a 
lot more limited. 
  
•  Your outdoor activities are 
a lot more limited. 
 
•  You have a lot less energy. 
 
 
•  You are in a lot more pain.   
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